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FROZEN EMBRYOS: THE CONSTITUTION ON ICE
I. INTRODUCTION
In this age of advanced technology, the medical field has created
newer and better ways of easing life's hardships. One of the most preva-
lent medical problems affecting millions of American couples today is
infertility.' Medical research, combined with advanced technology, has
helped to bring children to couples who previously had no other choice
but adoption.
Today there are at least two generally accepted methods of assisting
infertile couples. One such method is through artificial insemination
(Ai). This procedure involves artificially inseminating a woman with
sperm from her husband/partner (Artificial Insemination-Husband or
AIH) or from a donor (Artificial Insemination-Donor or AID). Any
number of possibilities can ensue if the woman herself is infertile or un-
able to carry the child.2
In addition to AI, another procedure may be utilized-in-vitro fer-
tilization (IVF). IVF involves the mating of egg and sperm in a labora-
tory dish. Using this method, the sperm of either the husband or donor
is combined with the ovum of either the mother or donor and implanted
in either the mother or surrogate. To make matters even more complex,
a process has been developed whereby the fertilized embryo can be stored
in liquid nitrogen. This process freezes the embryo until it is needed for
implantation.3
This complicated technology seems quite simple, however, when
compared to the legal gymnastics that must be performed in order to
determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved. For ex-
ample, when Mario and Elsa Rios were unable to bear a child by natural
means, they went to the Queen Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne,
I. It is estimated that seven million American couples have infertility problems. Men-
ning, The Psychology of Infertility, in INFERTILITY DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT, 17 (J.
Aiman ed. 1984).
2. See Appendix for list of combinations possible when artificial insemination (AI) or in-
vitro fertilization (IVF) are utilized.
3. The term "frozen embryo" is really a misnomer. At the time the mixture of ova and
sperm is stored in the liquid nitrogen, it is not yet ascertainable whether the ovum is fertilized
and, therefore, it is not yet an "embryo." The definition of an embryo is a "developing organ-
ism.., from about two weeks after fertilization to the end of the seventh or eighth week."
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 432 (26th ed. 1981). However, since the
phrase "frozen embryo" is used as a term of art, and for the purpose of simplicity, this term
will be used throughout this Comment.
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Australia for help. The couple produced three test tube embryos, two of
which were frozen in liquid nitrogen while the third was implanted in
Mrs. Rios' uterus. This implantation failed, but the two frozen embryos
remained stored for future use. Unfortunately, the couple was killed in a
plane crash before any further attempts at in-vitro fertilization were
possible.4
The legal issues presented by this unusual incident are vexing. Can
the frozen embryos be destroyed or must they be accorded some sort of
constitutional protection? If destruction of the frozen embryos is prohib-
ited, must they be implanted in a surrogate mother? If they are born,
who are their legal parents? What inheritance rights do they have with
respect to their biological parents?
The list of legal issues is too expansive to be covered within the
scope of this Comment. Accordingly, this Comment will focus on the
right of women who wish to undergo the in-vitro fertilization procedure
to control the fate of the frozen embryo.' An analysis will be made of
their rights as compared to the state's interest in protecting the embryo.
Since the most closely related body of law is that which deals with abor-
tion, the analysis in this Comment will be based on the fundamental right
of privacy. In addition, this Comment proposes certain guidelines by
which lawmakers should draft legislation related to this complicated new
world of high-tech conception.
II. THE FROZEN EMBRYO
For the millions of women who are unable to become pregnant natu-
rally, in-vitro fertilization (IVF) has made childbearing a realistic possi-
bility. Assuming that the woman and her partner are fertile, their
respective ova and sperm are retrieved, combined in a laboratory dish,
and implanted in the woman. If the implantation is successful, the wo-
man will become pregnant and bear a child.
In reality, this scenario is not simplistic or risk free. In order to
retrieve an ovum from the ovary, the woman must undergo a laparos-
copy.' This is a delicate surgical procedure that carries with it risks and
4. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984, at A12, col. 4. Although a scholarly committee recom-
mended that the embryos be destroyed, Australian lawmakers passed an amendment allowing
for the embryos to be implanted in a surrogate mother and put up for adoption. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1984, at A18, col. 4.
5. While this Comment focuses on the woman's rights, it recognizes that a husband or
partner has a valid, and arguably equal interest in the fate of the embryo. See infra text accom-
panying notes 70-74 for a discussion of the rights involved in spousal notification.
6. The laparoscopy is performed under general anesthesia. Surgeons insert a laparoscope
('/3 inch in diameter) through a small incision in the abdomen in order to see inside the ovary.
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pain, so that it is in the woman's best interests to undergo only as many
of these procedures as are necessary for treatment.
7
Once an ovum has been retrieved the sperm is added to the egg and,
if all goes well, the fertilization process begins. When the embryo is at
least two to eight cells in size, it is implanted in the woman's uterus.
Since the most successful clinics offer only about a twenty percent suc-
cess rate,8 and because the odds improve with each successive attempt, a
woman may have to undergo several attempts at fertilization before a
successful pregnancy is achieved. With the risks and costs inherent in
undergoing numerous laparoscopies,9 embryo freezing seems to be the
safest and least expensive solution. A woman whose first implantation
was unsuccessful could avoid further unnecessary laparoscopies by stor-
age of the fertilized embryos.
The troubling issue presented by this scientific development is
whether a woman who is implanted successfully has a constitutional
right to determine the fate of the unused frozen embryos.
If a state may validly assert an interest in the potential life of frozen
embryos, it could require a woman to choose between storing the em-
bryos for her own future use or releasing them for someone else's use.
While some women could easily choose between these options, others
may not want another woman to bear a child with their embryo and
would rather dispose of the unused frozen embryos.
At first blush, disposing of the unused embryos would not seem to
present a problem because the woman would be disposing of her own six-
to-eight cell organism. Yet, if one asserts that life begins at the moment
of conception,"0 this destruction is no less abhorrent than abortion.
Testifying before congressional hearings, Reverend Donald McCar-
thy, of the Pope John XXII Medical-Moral Research and Education
Center in St. Louis, argued that every embryo is entitled to a panoply of
constitutional rights."1 These rights include a right not to be frozen, not
to be experimented upon, not to be destroyed and even a right not to be
A long, hollow needle is then inserted through a second incision in the abdomen and the eggs
and surrounding fluid are suctioned up. Although some clinics use the less expensive proce-
dure of ultrasound imaging to guide the needle into the ovary, this technique may be less
reliable than laparoscopy. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 49.
7. Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilization: Why Parliament
Must Legislate, 51 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 236, 237 (1983).
8. Wallis, supra note 6, at 50.
9. In the United States each attempt at ovum retrieval costs between $3000 and $5000,
not including travel costs and hours missed from work. Id.
10. See infra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's view
that life begins at the moment of conception.
11. Friedrich, "A Legal, Moral Social Nightmare," TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54, 55.
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created except out of "'personal sel-giving and conjugal love.' ,12 At
this point in the development of this legal-ethical-medical dilemma, it is
unclear whether or not any or all of these concepts could become legisla-
tive realities.
13
With the emergence of a strong "pro-life" lobby, and the emotion-
ally sensitive issue of fetal research, 4 It is not unlikely that the following
legislation one day could be enacted: "It shall be unlawful to destroy a
fetus conceived outside a woman's body."
Yet today, the right to choose an abortion without unduly burden-
some state interference is protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, which encompasses the fundamental right of
privacy.
1 5
The following discussion analyzes the applicability of the fourteenth
amendment right of privacy to the above hypothetical statute. Specifi-
cally, one of the privacy interests recognized by the Court in Roe v.
Wade16 will be analyzed and applied to the frozen embryo problem. This
Comment concludes that the right of privacy promulgated by the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade encompasses a privacy interest both in
bodily integrity and in the making of procreative choices and that it
could be successfully asserted to challenge the constitutionality of any
legislation protecting frozen embryos.
III. ROE V. WADE
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court recognized a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy without undue government interfer-
ence.1" The Court's decision was based upon a balancing of the woman's
fundamental rights with the relevant state interests.1 8 In order to deter-
mine the effects of Roe v. Wade on issues arising from the existence of the
12. Id. (quoting Reverend Donald McCarthy).
13. In order to justify such legislation, states would have to bestow rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause on beings not held to be persons in the eyes of the
law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
14. Id. at 153; City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-
20 (1983).
15. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). In this landmark abortion decision, a
pregnant single woman brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
criminal abortion laws. The Court held that state criminal abortion laws that except from
criminal prosecution only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf, without regard to the
stage of pregnancy and other relevant factors, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 147-64.
18. Id. at 162-63.
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frozen embryo phenomenon, it is necessary to examine the relevant prin-
ciples promulgated in that decision.
As its basic premise, the Roe Court recognized that a right of pri-
vacy does exist, although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. 19
The Court held that this personal privacy guarantee encompasses the
right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy.' 0
The Court concluded, however, that the right of privacy is not un-
qualified: it must be weighed against the important state interests such as
protecting potential life.2 When "fundamental" rights are at stake, how-
ever, any state regulation limiting such rights must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest under a strict level of judicial scrutiny. 2
The Roe Court determined that the state's interest in potential life is
19. The fundamental right of privacy was first defined by the Court in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state
statute that prohibited married couples from using contraceptives. While acknowledging that
there is no express right of privacy in the Constitution, Justice Douglas found this right to exist
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights guarantees. Id. at 484. Therefore, this newly created
right was of sufficient constitutional dimension to be protected from unwarranted state intru-
sion. Id. at 484-86.
The right of privacy in sexual matters has been held to include a woman's right to decide
whether or not to bear or conceive children, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977), as well as the right to use abortion as a method of implementing this decision. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
21. Id. at 154. The Court recognized that some state regulation in the areas protected by
the right of privacy is appropriate when such regulation is based on interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards and in protecting potential life. Id. (emphasis added).
The Court used the term "potential life," but never defined it. Presumably, the term includes a
fetus from the time of conception onward. See infra note 23 for further discussion of this issue.
22. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (regulation limiting
right to vote subject to strict scrutiny); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (regu-
lation affecting right of interstate movement subject to strict scrutiny); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (regulation abridging right to free exercise of religion subject to strict
scrutiny).
The importance of labeling a right "fundamental" is to afford this right the greatest level
of constitutional protection. In order for a state to enact legislation which burdens a funda-
mental right, it must pass a test of strict judicial scrutiny. Under this test, the regulating state
must show a compelling state interest which overrides the fundamental right. In addition, the
legislation must be narrowly drawn, such that no less burdensome alternative is available. See
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (regulations imposing a burden on
the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child may be justified only by
compelling state interests and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1963) (State Department regulations deny-
ing passports to Communist Party members must be narrowly drawn and provide the least
intrusive alternative so as not to invade fifth amendment liberties); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (breach of peace statute must be narrowly drawn in order to avoid
impairment of the first amendment freedom of religion).
Other examples of "fundamental" rights include the right to vote and participate in the
electoral process, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to per-
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not always compelling.23 It established a timetable by which one could
discern when the state's interest becomes "compelling" and, thereby
overcomes the privacy right of the expectant mother to terminate her
pregnancy. 24 This system, based upon trimester units, has become the
sonal mobility in interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and the right to
freedom of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. An interesting problem with the Court's analysis is that it
seemed to imply that the state's interest in potential life was actually two distinct interests.
The Court recognized an interest in potential life that did not become compelling until the
third trimester. See infra note 24. Arguably, the Court had never before recognized an inter-
est that changed with the passage of time. Interests normally change over time because soci-
ety's morals change or because societal conditions change. But here, an interest that at one
time could not withstand judicial scrutiny, can later pass constitutional muster simply by the
passage of two trimesters. Thus, it is reasonable to deduce that the Court created two distinct
interests: one in potential life and one in viable life.
In the most recent affirmation of Roe, Justice O'Connor's dissent asserted that "potential
life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward." City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the state has a single interest in potential life that
exists throughout the pregnancy. Id. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The timetable established by the Court is based on a trimester
approach. The pregnancy is divided into three time units, each accounting for one-third of the
pregnancy. The Court concluded that a state may regulate the abortion procedure only after
the end of the first trimester if that regulation relates to maternal health. Id. at 163. The
Court based its determination on medical evidence that established that the mortality rate
from abortions in the first trimester was less than the mortality rate for childbirth. Thus, the
end of the first trimester is the point at which the state's interest in protecting maternal health
becomes compelling. Id.
With respect to regulations relating to the protection of fetal life, the Court concluded
that at a point subsequent to fetal viability a state may prohibit abortion except where it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Fetal viability is the point at which the
fetus has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. The Court's rationale in
choosing this time period was based on medical evidence that the moment at which the fetus
becomes viable occurs approximately at the end of the second trimester. Thus, fetal viability is
the point at which the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling. Id. at
163-64.
In Akron, Justice O'Connor began her attack on the Court's abortion analysis by chal-
lenging the trimester approach. Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She
pointed out that the state's interest in maternal health and in potential life changes as medical
technology changes. Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). On the one hand, as it becomes
safer for a woman to undergo an abortion procedure later in her pregnancy, states will presum-
ably be forbidden to implement maternal health regulations until later and later into the preg-
nancy. On the other hand, medical advances in the field of prenatal medicine demonstrate that
fetal viability at earlier stages of pregnancy may be possible in the near future. Id. at 457 n.5
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the "viability" point at which a state is permitted to
regulate abortions, thereby promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, will also
occur earlier and earlier in the pregnancy. Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that the Roe trimes-
ter system is on a collision course with itself, making it an unworkable balancing test for the
rights involved. Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that while this Comment assumes the continued validity of the right
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core of many Supreme Court abortion decisions since Roe was decided.25
As the Court made clear in later cases, the essence of Roe v. Wade is
that any regulation which interferes with the abortion decision during
the first trimester will be held constitutionally invalid.26 Although the
"essence" of Roe is ascertainable, the Court failed to provide a precise
definition of the privacy rights it purported to create. As Professor Ely
points out, it is "entirely proper to infer a general right of privacy, so
long as some care is taken in defining the sort of right the inference will
support."27 Therefore, it is essential to determine the specific right cre-
ated in Roe so that the right may be applied in cases that differ
factually. 28
IV. THE ROE PRIVACY RIGHT
The right of privacy is said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or
its penumbras.29 One significant area in which this personal liberty has
been recognized is that of personal, marital, familial and sexual privacy.
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,"0 the Supreme Court ruled that
fundamental constitutional guarantees created a "zone of privacy" for
created in Roe v. Wade, the valid criticism of the trimester approach by Justice O'Connor is a
genuine threat to the viability of the Roe framework.
25. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (state statute requiring
that abortions after twelve weeks be performed in a hospital declared unconstitutional); Simo-
poulous v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (state statute requiring that second trimester abor-
tions be performed in licensed clinics was not an unreasonable means of furthering state's
compelling interests in protecting maternal health); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (state abortion ordinance requiring all second trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital, parental consent, informed consent, a 24 hour waiting
period and disposal of fetal remains held unconstitutional); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979) (state statute requiring a determination of fetal viability before a specific abortion tech-
nique is utilized held unconstitutionally vague); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (state abortion statute requiring execution of spousal consent form, execution of paren-
tal consent form, a physician to preserve the fetus' life and prohibiting the use of the most
commonly used abortion procedure during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy held
unconstitutional).
26. "Roe clearly establish[es] that the State may not restrict the decision of the [woman]
... regarding abortion during the first stage of pregnancy." Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66 (1976).
However, the Court has permitted some state regulation during the first trimester.
Although it invalidated most of the provisions of the Missouri abortion statute in Danforth, the
Court upheld the written consent and recordkeeping provisions of the statute because they did
not interfere with the abortion decision or the doctor-patient relationship. Id. at 65-67, 79-81.
27. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929
(1973).
28. The cases cited supra at note 25 all involved abortion regulations. For the purposes of
this Comment, the facts involve the destruction of an embryo, but do not involve the termina-
tion of a pregnancy.
29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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married couples which prevented states from criminally penalizing the
use of contraceptives.31 This "zone of privacy" concept has been ex-
panded to include the right to terminate pregnancy and the right to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment.32
These privacy rights represent two interests: (1) a privacy interest in
controlling one's own body and (2) a privacy interest in making personal
life choices.
A. The Right to Bodily Integrity
While states retain some control over what a person may do with or
to his or her own body,33 courts have recognized certain qualified privacy
rights in this area. These rights have been asserted to prevent a state
from forcing unwanted medical treatment upon a person, as well as to
prevent a state from withholding treatment.34
The right has been recognized to prevent a state from forcing life-
sustaining procedures upon a patient.35 In In re Quinlan,36 the father of
a comatose twenty-two year old woman sought appointment as his
daughter's guardian and the express authorization to discontinue all ex-
traordinary procedures used to sustain her life.37 After determining that
the father had standing to assert his daughter's constitutional rights,
38
the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the right of privacy. Basing its
conclusion on the Supreme Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut,
the New Jersey court held that the privacy right founded in Griswold
"encompass[ed] a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
31. Id. at 485-86. The right of privacy was extended to include the right of unmarried
persons to use contraceptives in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
32. See Comment, Discontinuing Treatment of Comatose Patients Who Have Not Executed
Living Wills, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. (1985).
33. For example, states can prohibit one from using controlled substances, see, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West Supp. 1985) and from selling one's body in prostitu-
tion, see, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West Supp. 1985).
34. Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technol-
ogy and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 795, 802 (1980).
35. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Similar
rights have also been recognized. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (fourteenth
amendment encompasses freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint); In re Guardianship of
Richard Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (liberty interest to refuse psychotropic
drugs founded in common law and federal Constitution); Superintendent v. Saikewics, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (court authorized withholding painful chemotherapy treat-
ment for 67 year old retarded leukemia patient).
36. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
38. Id. at 34-35, 355 A.2d at 660.
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certain circumstances."39 The patient's exercise of this right is an exer-
cise of personal choice.4
Similarly, the right to obtain contraceptive devices has been recog-
nized to prevent a state from withholding medical treatment. In Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,41 a lecturer on contraception was arrested for giving an
unmarried woman a package of contraceptive foam. He was subse-
quently convicted under a Massachusetts statute that made it a felony for
anyone to give contraceptives to unmarried individuals.a2 Relying on
Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy encompasses
a right for both married and unmarried persons to use contraceptives.43
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual
... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."'
The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and the right to use con-
traceptives both may be analyzed as rights over one's own body. Both
involve either the introduction of foreign matter into the body or the
prevention thereof.45 These rights also may be analyzed, however, as
rights to make personal life decisions.
B. The Right to Make Personal Life Choices
When one thinks of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, the freedom from bodily intrusion comes to mind.4 6 Yet, more
than making a decision not to undergo treatment for a disease or to be
free from a respirator, a patient who exercises this right is making a life
decision. Often the decision made is not a choice between living with or
without a respirator; rather, it is a choice between life and death.
Likewise, when the right to use contraceptives is exercised, freedom
from bodily intrusion comes into play.4 7 On a more practical level, the
39. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court also noted that the Griswold privacy right was
the same right that encompasses "a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy." Id.
40. Clarke, supra note 34, at 801.
41. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 21 (West 1970).
43. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55.
44. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
45. Contraception may be viewed as the right to introduce foreign matter, i.e., the pill or
diaphragm, while refusing life-sustaining treatment may be viewed as the right to refuse such
introduction, i.e., preventing the unwanted use of drugs, respirators, and such to sustain life.
46. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
47. Although the term "intrusion" seems a bit harsh, a woman who has an unwanted
pregnancy may in fact view the fetus as an intruder.
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choice to use contraceptives is a procreative decision. It is a choice be-
tween creating life and not creating life.
The exercise of this right is distinguishable from the exercise of the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment because when one uses
contraceptives, one does not destroy life.48 The underlying concepts of
these rights, however, are the same: a state may not impermissibly in-
hibit the right of an individual to make these personal life choices.49
C. Abortion: The Right to Bodily Integrity or Procreative Choice?
Although a single right may involve both an interest in making per-
sonal choices and an interest in bodily integrity, the question remains
whether the privacy right promulgated in Roe v. Wade encompasses one
or both of these interests and whether it should be extended to the frozen
embryo problem.
1. Roe as a bodily integrity right
It can easily be argued that the Roe v. Wade privacy right only en-
compasses a woman's right over her body. First, the factual setting in
Roe involved a pregnancy.50 The Court's rationale for imposing first tri-
mester restrictions, whereby a state is prohibited from interfering with
the abortion decision, 1 demonstrates that the Court relied heavily on the
fact that the fetus was in the woman's uterus. During the first trimester
of pregnancy a woman's privacy interest must be balanced with the
state's interest in maternal health.52 But the only time a woman's health
is at issue is when she is actually pregnant.53 If the fetus is developing
outside her body, abortion poses no risk to the mother's health. There-
fore, the right articulated by the Roe Court may only involve the control
over one's own body.
The Court has also ruled that an expectant father's rights to control
the fate of the fetus are not equal to those of the pregnant woman. In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,4 the Court held unconstitutional Mis-
souri abortion statutes containing spousal and parental consent require-
48. See infra text accompanying note 68 for discussion of the intrauterine contraceptive
device.
49. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973).
51. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. See supra note 24.
53. But see supra text accompanying notes 6-7 for a discussion of the risks involved in
IVF.
54. 428 U.S. 52 (1972).
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ments." This demonstrates a differentiation between the rights of a
pregnant woman and her spouse. Arguably, the parties' rights would be
equal if the right was one of procreative choice. This differentiation im-
plies that the right of privacy in Roe, on which Danforth is based, is
unique to the woman.56 Therefore, it supports reading Roe narrowly, as
upholding the right of a woman to control her body and not a procrea-
tive right.
If one were to conclude that the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment and the right to use contraceptives only constituted rights to bodily
integrity, and not rights to make life-determining decisions, it would
make sense to read Roe similarly. In fact, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Quinlan
and Roe were based on the Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut.
And just as the Court in Eisenstadt relied heavily on Griswold, the Court
in Roe relied on Griswold and Eisenstadt in establishing a right to decide
whether or not to abort a fetus. Finally, in Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that the right of privacy recognized in Griswold "is
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treat-
ment ...in much the same way as it ...encompass[es] a woman's
decision to terminate pregnancy."'5 7 Assuming these cases constitute a
linear progression,58 Roe could be viewed as establishing only a privacy
interest preserving bodily integrity.
2. Roe as a right of procreative choice
While arguments that Roe v. Wade encompasses a privacy interest
in bodily integrity are persuasive, it makes more sense to read Roe as
encompassing a general privacy right to make procreative decisions.
First, the language of the cases on which Roe is based use terms which
point to a decision-making right. For example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,59
the Court speaks of "the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'
Moreover, the language of Roe itself demonstrates a privacy interest in
decision-making. The Court speaks of a right "broad enough to encom-
55. For the full text of the Missouri statutes in question, see id. at 84-89 (Appendix To
Opinion Of The Court).
56. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for discussion of rights involved in
spousal notification.
57. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
58. See Developments In The Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1156, 1183-85 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
59. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
60. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (per-
sonal privacy right extends to "freedom of choice to marry").
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pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."61
In addition, commentators on the subject have referred to the right estab-
lished in Roe as "the ight... to make unimpeded contraceptive deci-
sions,"62 the "right to make procreative choices' 63 and the right to make
"the abortion decision."'  The use of these terms supports a general pri-
vacy interest in procreative choice.
Second, while abortions and contraception are factually distinguish-
able,65 the right to the abortion decision was based, in part, on the recog-
nition of the right to use contraceptives." Since the decision to use
contraception involves a privacy interest in making procreative decisions,
it follows that the privacy right recognized in Roe encompasses, in part, a
procreative decision.
On a strictly biological level, the distinction made between abortion
and contraception is that the latter prevents the formation of a fetus,
while the former destroys a fetus. An interesting twist to this theory is
that doctors are not clear about how the intrauterine device (IUD)
works.67 The most prevalent theory, however, is that the IUD agitates
the walls of the uterus so that afertilized ovum cannot attach itself and is
therefore expelled. 8 If this is true, this form of contraception is actually
a form of abortion because the fertilized ovum is already an embryo
when it is expelled from the body. Contraception, including the use of
IUDs, which prevents pregnancy in a manner similar to that of abortion,
has been held to be a right of procreative choice.69 Therefore, even the
abortion decision is one of procreative choice.
Finally, although the Court has invalidated spousal consent require-
ments,70 it has yet to rule on spousal notification requirements. In
Scheinberg v. Smith,7 1 the Fifth Circuit held that a Florida statute requir-
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (1973) (emphasis added).
62. Developments, supra note 58, at 1184 (emphasis added).
63. Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman's Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
661, 686 (1983).
64. Note, Spousal Notification Requirement Is Constitutionally Permissible Burden on Wo-
man's Right to Privacy in Abortion Decision: Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F2d 476 (5th Cir.
1981), 13 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1495, 1497 (1982).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
66. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54; and id. at 460, 463-65
(White, J., concurring in result)).
67. M. HARPER, BIRTH CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES-PROSPECTS BY THE YEAR 2000 46-
47 (1983).
68. Id.
69. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1972). See supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
71. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ing a married pregnant woman to notify her husband before terminating
her pregnancy was not an unconstitutional burden on her right of pri-
vacy.72 Although a woman may not be substantially burdened in the
abortion decision, the court held that the state had a legitimate interest in
the institution of marriage.73 This interest included a "husband's interest
in the procreative potential of the marriage" and was based, in part, on
Griswold v. Connecticut.74 Both husband and wife have an interest in
making procreative decisions. If one accepts the notion that Griswold
encompasses a right to bodily integrity, and the analysis of the Fifth Cir-
cuit giving an expectant father a decision-making right, then the right of
privacy, at least according to one federal appellate court, encompasses a
bodily integrity right as well as a decision-making right when applied to
abortion decisions.
Cases which have analyzed and applied the right of privacy have
interpreted that right as encompassing both a privacy interest in making
personal life choices and a privacy interest in controlling one's body.
This Comment suggests that the abortion right created in Roe also en-
compasses these rights and that courts would have to apply them to any
statutes protecting frozen embryos.
V. THE ROE RIGHT APPLIED TO FROZEN EMBRYOS
As discussed in part II of this Comment, the in-vitro fertilization
(IVF) procedure involves the attempted fertilization of an ovum with a
sperm in a laboratory dish.7 5 While some fertilized ovum are implanted
in the woman's uterus in the hope of a successful pregnancy, the remain-
ing embryos are frozen for future use by placing them in liquid nitro-
gen.76 If this first implantation is successful, the now pregnant woman
may wish to assert a right to decide the fate of the remaining frozen
embryos.7" The question is whether the privacy right established in Roe
encompasses a woman's right to decide the fate of her "test tube
embryos."
72. Id. at 486. The court remanded in order to determine whether the statute met the
constitutional requirement of being narrowly drawn. Id. at 187.
73. Id. at 483.
74. Id.
75. See supra introductory paragraph of part II for a discussion of the in-vitro fertilization
procedure.
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. If the first implantation is unsuccessful, an-
other implantation would be attempted with the previously frozen embryos. See supra notes 8-
9 and accompanying text.
77. While some women would want them kept in storage for future use and others would
allow them to be used by other IVF patients, it is likely that at least some women would rather
have their frozen embryos destroyed.
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If it is concluded that the right of privacy, as promulgated by the
Roe Court, constitutes only a privacy interest in maintaining one's bodily
integrity, a woman who undergoes in-vitro fertilization using the freezing
process would not have standing to assert this right. Since the frozen
embryo over which she is asserting a privacy interest is located in a labo-
ratory dish, and not in her uterus, a right to control her body is inappli-
cable.78 If, however, the right of privacy promulgated in Roe primarily
constitutes a privacy interest in making procreative decisions, the deci-
sion to dispose of excess frozen embryos would be a constitutionally valid
exercise of this right.
Just as a procreative choice is made in using contraceptives or in
terminating a pregnancy, the same choice is being made with respect to
the fate of the frozen embryo.79 As discussed above,80 the right of pri-
vacy created by the Griswold v. Connecticut-Roe v. Wade line of cases
encompasses a privacy interest in both bodily integrity and procreative
choice. Accordingly, whether analyzed as a form of abortion or as a
form of contraception, the destruction of unwanted frozen embryos is a
right protected by the fourteenth amendment right of privacy. It is a
procreative choice which may not be unduly burdened by state regula-
tion. Since the state's interest in potential life does not become compel-
ling until viability, the state could not meet that burden here.8'
In addition to the assertion of this constitutional right of privacy,
82
any legislation which forbids the destruction of frozen embryos would be
bad policy. The only factor differentiating a woman in the very early
stages of pregnancy from a woman who has not yet been implanted with
an embryo she and her partner created is the location of the embryo. If
society permits the destruction of an embryo that is inside a woman's
body, but not the destruction of an embryo in a petri dish, absurd results
could occur. Conceivably, the woman who is not permitted to destroy
the embryo in the petri dish will simply have it implanted in her uterus.
If the implantation is unsuccessful, she need not worry further. If, how-
78. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
79. However, simply because a woman asserts a right does not mean she will prevail on the
merits. In some cases the state may be able to show the requisite compelling interest. See
supra note 22.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 29-68.
81. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
82. Since women who cannot have children have never been considered a suspect class, an
equal protection argument most likely would fail here. Although the state would be treating
these women differently than women who could bear children naturally, and therefore obtain
abortions, the state need only show a rational basis for this regulation. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985) (statute affecting mentally retarded sub-
ject to low level scrutiny because mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification).
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ever, the implantation is successful, she can simply exercise her four-
teenth amendment privacy right to terminate her pregnancy by obtaining
an abortion. This circumvention of the rule prohibiting the destruction
of frozen embryos would pose unnecessary health risks to many wo-
men. 3 It would also be cost prohibitive to many, thereby creating a po-
tential equal protection problem.
8 4
This illustration of the problem posed by a statute prohibiting the
destruction of frozen embryos demonstrates the ineffectiveness of such a
rule. A regulation so easily circumvented is not likely to be viable. Ac-
cordingly, a more realistic approach must be taken in balancing the com-
peting interests involved.
VI. PROPOSAL
This Comment has presented an analytical approach to one of the
many issues that will arise as the freezing of embryos becomes a more
routine medical practice. Since the analysis has been presented in terms
of hypothetical legislation that would presumably be held unconstitu-
tional under Roe v. Wade, it would be helpful to suggest legislation that
would be constitutionally valid.
The freezing of human embryos is likely to become as emotionally
charged an issue as abortion. Although the Court has recognized a wo-
man's fundamental right to decide whether to have children" and has
recognized her right to implement that decision through abortion,8 6 there
is a generally accepted recognition of the human desire to have children.
Therefore, medical technology has strived to make procreation a more
safe and viable option for those who desire it. While one out of every six
American couples is affected by infertility, 7 new conception and
childbearing techniques are developed daily.
There is, however, a real concern over fetal experimentation and
other questionable uses for these human embryos. Thus, thirty-nine
states have already enacted statutes restricting fetal research and/or arti-
83. This rule subjects the woman who does not want to give away her embryos to the
health risks inherent in pregnancy and abortion. This certainly runs contrary to the states'
interest in maternal health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
84. See supra note 82. It is also arguable that a woman who cannot afford the procedure is
being discriminated against. Since the Court has not held economic status to be a suspect
classification, this argument could easily be rebutted by a showing of a rationally based state
interest in protecting potential life. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (indigency
is not a suspect classification).
85. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
87. Wallis, supra note 6, at 46.
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ficial insemination.88
But before states begin legislating restrictions affecting the freezing
of embryos, they must be conscious of the legal framework under which
these restrictions will be analyzed. If legislation is drafted with the Roe
doctrines in mind, the Supreme Court will not have to take steps to "leg-
islate" for the states.8 9
Accordingly, the following proposal is presented as a guideline in
drafting legislation that would not offend the constitutional doctrines
presented in Roe and its progeny:90
Embryo freezing will be permitted subject to the following
provisions:
1. Stored embryos should be kept for the specific treatment of a
particular couple or patient, unless informed consent is given for an alter-
nate use.
2. The maximum time limit for storage of frozen embryos is that
period of time which is equivalent to the natural reproductive capabilities
of the couple.
3. If techniques for retrieving ova are developed that are reliable,
relatively risk-free and not cost prohibitive, a woman should create only
one embryo at a time.
Part one of the statute allows a couple to exercise its fourteenth
amendment right to decide the fate of the embryo. In addition it pre-
vents fetal experimentation without consent.
Although the purpose of advanced medical technology is to tran-
scend nature, part two of the statute recognizes that if a time limit on
storage were not imposed, the legal and societal problems created would
be unbearable. Imagine the reaction to the bequeathing of a frozen em-
bryo from generation to generation.
The third part of the statute suggests that a woman create only one
embryo for each attempt at impregnation. The state would be given the
88. Those states restricting fetal research include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, New York, N. Carolina, N. Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, S. Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. For a listing of the relevant state statutes see Andrews, The Stork Market: The
Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J. 50, 54-55 (Aug. 1984).
89. One of the major problems many legal commentators have with the Roe decision is not
that they disagree with the result; rather, they feel that the Supreme Court should not be
acting as a legislative body. See Ely, supra note 27, at 947.
90. Although many more details would need to be included in actual legislation, this pro-
posal should serve as a basic guideline to drafting a statute that could withstand judicial review
under the Roe analysis.
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opportunity to prove that creating one embryo at a time is not a substan-
tial burden on the woman's right to make a procreative choice. If it is
not a substantial burden, then the state's interest in potential life can be
asserted without unduly burdening the woman's procreative choice.
Based on the analytic framework set forth in Roe, the proposal takes
into account both the state's interest and the woman's fundamental
rights. Since the couple must give its consent before their frozen embryo
is used for a purpose other than the woman's implantation, the woman's
fundamental right of privacy is advanced. On the other hand, if medical
technology advances to the point of creating a risk-free procedure for
retrieving ova and the state requires a woman to produce only one em-
bryo at a time, the state's interest in protecting potential life will be pro-
tected. Accordingly, this proposal is a viable method of balancing the
competing interests involved.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade provides a significant
precedent for approaching new issues in the very personal and delicate
area of human conception. While the idea of freezing human embryos
may seem like a fascinating project of the future, in reality, it is used
today to assist couples who cannot have children naturally and who can-
not afford the money or health risks involved in undertaking the ovum-
retrieval procedure many times. In order to prevent this approach to
conception from becoming a science fiction horror, the subject must be
approached with the highest moral and ethical scrutiny. The Supreme
Court has presented a framework in which to approach the complex is-
sues involved. Unfortunately, these issues are much more complicated
than the Court, or anyone else, could ever have anticipated when this
framework was established.
Until such time as the Court is presented with these new and com-
plex issues, either Congress or the state legislatures must take steps to
anticipate the potential problems, such as the one discussed in this Com-
ment, and provide solutions for them based on the framework in Roe v.
Wade. Unless the legislatures act soon, millions of infertile couples will
have to take their chances and wait for legal nature to take its course.
Tzivia Schwartz
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APPENDIX
The following list gives an idea of the numerous combinations that
are possible when artificial insemination (AI) or in-vitro fertilization
(IVF) are utilized:
For Al- 1. OM + SD = CM
2. OD + SF = CD
3. OD + SD = CM
4. OD + SF = CM
ForIVF- 5. OM + SF = CM
6. OM + SD = CM
7. OD + SF = CM
8. OD + SD = CM
9. OD + SF = CD
10. OD + SD = CD
11. OM + SF = CD
12. OM + SD = CD
OM= Ovum from mother: mother is fertile.
OD = Ovum from donor: mother is infertile.
SF = Sperm from father: father is fertile.
SD = Sperm from donor: father is infertile.
CM = Child born from mother: mother able to carry child to term.
CD = Child born from donor: mother unable to carry child to term;
embryo implanted in surrogate mother.
